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Abstract
Concurrent games with a fixed number of agents have been thoroughly studied, with various solution
concepts and objectives for the agents. In this paper, we consider concurrent games with an arbitrary
number of agents, and study the problem of synthesizing a coalition strategy to achieve a global
safety objective. The problem is non-trivial since the agents do not know a priori how many they
are when they start the game. We prove that the existence of a safe arbitrary-large coalition strategy
for safety objectives is a PSPACE-hard problem that can be decided in exponential space.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Verification by model checking
Keywords and phrases concurrent games; parameterized verification; strategy synthesis
1 Introduction
Context. The generalisation and everyday usage of modern distributed systems call both
for the verification and synthesis of algorithms or strategies running on distributed systems.
Concrete examples are cloud computing, blockchain technologies, servers with multiple clients,
wireless sensor networks, bio-chemical systems, or fleets of drones cooperating to achieve a
common goal [10]. In their general form, these systems are not only distributed, but they may
also involve an arbitrary number of agents. This explains the interest of the model-checking
community both for the verification of parameterized systems [14, 8], and for the synthesis
of distributed strategies [20]. Our contribution is at the crossroad of those topics.
Parameterized verification. Parameterized verification refers here to the verification of
systems formed of an arbitrary number of agents. Often, the precise number of agents is
unknown, yet, algorithms and protocols running on such distributed systems are designed
to operate correctly independently of the number of agents. The automated verification
and control of crowds, i.e. in case the agents are anonymous, is challenging. Remarkably,
subtle changes, such as the presence or absence of a controller in the system, can drastically
alter the complexity of the verification problems [14]. In the decidable cases, the intuition
that bugs appear for a small number of agents is sometimes confirmed theoretically by
the existence of a cutoff property, which reduces the parameterized model checking to the
verification of finitely many instances [13]. In the last 15 years, parameterised verification
algorithms were successfully applied to e.g. cache coherence protocols in uniform memory
access multiprocessors [12], or the core of simple reliable broadcast protocols in asynchronous
systems [16]. When agents have unique identifiers, most verification problems become
undecidable, especially if one can use identifiers in the code agents execute [3].
To our knowledge, there are few works on controlling parameterized systems. Excep-
tions are, control strategies for (probabilistic) broadcast networks [6] and for crowds of
(probabilistic) automata [5, 17, 11].
Distributed synthesis. The problem of distributed synthesis asks whether strategies for
individual agents can be designed to achieve a global objective, in a context where individuals
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2 Synthesizing safe coalition strategies
have only a partial knowledge of the environment. There are several possible formalizations
for distributed synthesis, for instance via an architecture of processes with communication
links between agents [20], or using coordination games [19, 18, 7]. The two settings are linked,
and many (un)decidability results have been proven, depending on various parameters.
Concurrent games on graphs. By allowing complex interactions between agents, con-
current games on graphs [1, 2] are a model of choice in several contexts, for instance for
multi-agents systems, or for coordination or planning problems. An arena for n agents is a
directed graph where the transitions are labeled by n-tuples of actions (or simply words of
length n). At each vertex of the graph, all n agents select simultaneously and independently
an action, and the next vertex is determined by the combined move consisting of all the
actions (or word formed of all the actions). Most often, one considers infinite duration
plays, i.e. plays generated by iterating this process forever. Concepts studied on multiagent
concurrent games include many borrowed from game theory, such as winning strategies (see
e.g. [1]), rationality of the agents (see e.g. [15]), Nash equilibria (see e.g. [22, 9]).
Parameterized concurrent games on graphs. In a previous work, we introduced
concurrent games in which the number of agents is arbitrary [4]. These games generalize
concurrent games with a fixed number of agents, and can be seen as a succinct representation
of infinitely many games, one for each fixed number of agents. This is done by replacing, on
edges of the arena, words representing the choice of each of the agents by languages of finite
yet a priori unbounded words. Such a parameterized arena can represent infinitely many
interaction situations, one for each possible number of agents. In parameterized concurrent
games, the agents do not know a priori the number of agents participating to the interaction.
Each agent observes the action it plays and the vertices the play goes through. These pieces
of information may refine the knowledge each agent has on the number of involved agents.
Such a game model raises new interesting questions, since the agents do not know
beforehand how many they are. In [4], we first considered the question of whether Agent 1
can ensure a reachability objective independently of the number of her opponents, and no
matter how they play. The problem is non trivial since Agent 1 must win with a uniform
strategy. We proved that when edges are labeled with regular languages, the problem is
PSPACE-complete; and for positive instances one can effectively compute a winning strategy
in polynomial space.
v0
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
(ΣΣ
)+
Σ(ΣΣ) ∗
Σ +
Σ
+
(bb
)+
a(a
a)
∗
(aa) +
b(bb) ∗
Σ+
Σ+
Figure 1 Example of a parameterized arena.
All unspecified transitions lead to vertex v4.
Contribution. In this paper, we are inter-
ested in the coordination problem in concur-
rent parameterized games, with application
to distributed synthesis. Given a game arena
and an objective, the problem consists in syn-
thesizing for every potential agent involved
in the game a strategy that she should ap-
ply, so that, collectively, a global objective
is satisfied. In our setting, it is implicit that
agents have identifiers. However agents do
not communicate; their identifier will only
be used to select the vertices the game proceeds to. Furthermore, agents do not know how
many they are, they only see vertices which are visited, and can infer information about the
number of agents involved in the game.
To better understand the model and the problem, consider the game arena depicted
on Fig. 1. Edges are labeled by (regular) languages. Assuming the game starts at v0, the
game proceeds as follows: a positive integer k is selected by the environment, but is not
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revealed to the agents; then an infinite word w ∈ Σω is selected collectively by the agents
(this is the coalition strategy); the n-th letter of w represents the action played by Agent n;1
depending on whether the prefix of length k of w belongs to (ΣΣ)+ (in case k is even) or
Σ(ΣΣ)∗ (in case k is odd), the game proceeds to vertex v1 or v2; the process is repeated ad
infinitum, generating an infinite play in the graph. Depending on the winning condition, the
play will be winning or losing for k. The coalition strategy will be said winning whenever
the generated play is winning whatever the selected number k of agents is.
In this example, assuming the winning condition is to stay in the green vertices, there is
a simple winning strategy: play aω in v0, v1 and v2 (that is, all agents should play an a),
and if the game has gone through v1 (case of an even number of agents), then play aω in
v3 (all agents should play an a), otherwise play bω in v3 (all agents should play a b). This
ensures that the play never ends up in vertex v4.
In this paper, we focus on safety winning conditions: the agents must collectively ensure
that only safe vertices are visited along any play compatible with the coalition strategy in the
game. We prove that the existence of a winning coalition strategy is decidable in exponential
space, and that it is a PSPACE-hard problem. For positive instances, winning coalition
strategies with an exponential-size memory structure can be synthesized in exponential space.
2 Game setting
We use N>0 for the set of positive natural numbers. For an alphabet Σ and k ∈ N>0, Σk
denotes the set of all finite words of length k, Σ+ denotes the set of all finite but non-empty
words, and Σω denotes the set of all infinite words. For two words u ∈ Σ+ and w ∈ Σ+ ∪Σω,
we write u v w to denote u is a prefix of w, and for any k ∈ N>0, [w]≤k denotes the prefix
of length k of w (belongs to Σk). .
We introduced parameterized arenas in [4], a model of arenas with a parameterized number
of agents. Parameterized arenas extend arenas for concurrent games with a fixed number of
agents [1], by labeling the edges with languages over finite words, which may be of different
lengths. Each word represents a joint move of the agents, for instance u = a1 · · · ak ∈ Σk
assumes there are k agents, and for every 1 ≤ n ≤ k, Agent n chooses action an.
I Definition 1. A parameterized arena is a tuple A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉 where
V is a finite set of vertices;
Σ is a finite set of actions;
∆ : V × V → 2Σ+ is a partial transition function.
It is required that for every (v, v′) ∈ V × V , ∆(v, v′) describes a regular language.
Fix a parameterized arena A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉. The arena A is deterministic if for every v ∈ V ,
and every word u ∈ Σ+, there is at most one vertex v′ ∈ V such that u ∈ ∆(v, v′). The
arena is assumed to be complete: for every v ∈ V and u ∈ Σ+, there exists v′ ∈ V such that
u ∈ ∆(v, v′). This assumption is natural: such an arena will be used to play games with an
arbitrary number of agents, hence for the game to be non-blocking, successor vertices should
exist whatever that number is and irrespective of the choices of actions.
I Example 2. We already gave an example in the introduction. Let us give another example,
which will be useful for illustrating the constructions made in the paper. Fig. 2 presents a
non-deterministic parameterized arena. As such the arena is not complete, we assume that
1 This is where identifiers are implicitely used.
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all unspecified moves lead to an extra unsafe vertex ⊥, not depicted here. If for some number
of agents k (selected by environment and not known to the agents), the k-length prefix of
the word collectively chosen by the agents at v0 belongs to a∗ba∗, then the play either stays
at v0 or moves to v1 (again selected by environment).
v0 v1
v2
a∗ba∗
a
Σ+
b∨aa+
a∗ba∗
Figure 2 Example of a non-
deterministic parameterized arena.
Only safe vertices (colored in green)
have been depicted here. All unspe-
cified transitions lead to a non-safe
vertex ⊥.
History, play and strategy. We fix a parameterized
arena A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉. A history in A is a finite sequence
of vertices, that is compatible with the edges: formally,
h = v0v1 . . . vp ∈ V + such that for every 1 ≤ j < p,
∆(vj , vj+1) is defined. We write HistA for the set of all
histories. An infinite sequence of vertices compatible with
the edges is called a play.
A strategy for Agent n is a mapping σn : HistA → Σ
that associates an action to every history. A strategy
profile is a tuple of strategies, one for each agent. Since
the number of agents is not fixed a priori, a strategy profile
is an infinite tuple of strategies: σ˜ = 〈σ1, σ2, . . .〉:
Observe that a strategy profile can equivalently be
described as a coalition strategy σ : HistA → Σω, as illustrated in Table 1. Indeed, if an
enumeration of histories (hj)j∈N is fixed, a strategy profile can be seen as a table with
infinitely many rows –one for each agent– and infinitely many columns indexed by histories.
Reading the table vertically provides the coalition strategy view: each history is mapped to
an ω-word, obtained by concatenating the actions chosen by each of the agents. Since, in
this paper, we are interested in the existence of a winning strategy profile, it is equivalent to
asking the existence of a winning coalition strategy (they may not be equivalent for some
other decision problems). In the sequel, we mostly take the coalition strategy view, but may
interchangeably also consider strategy profiles.
h0 h1 h2 h3 . . .
σ1 a b b b . . .
σ2 b b b b . . .
σ3 b a a a . . .
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1 From strategy profile to
coalition strategy.
Finite memory coalition strategies. Let σ : HistA →
Σω be a coalition strategy and M be a set. We say that the
strategy σ uses memory M whenever there exist minit ∈ M
and applications upd : M× V → M and act : M× V → Σω
such that by defining inductively m[h] ∈ M by m[v0] =
minit and m[h · v] = upd(m[h], v), we have that for every
h ∈ HistA, σ(h) = act(m[h], last(h)), where last(h) is the
last vertex of history h. The structure (M, upd) records
information on the history seen so far (m[h] is the memory
state “reached” after history h), and act dictates how all
the agents should play.
If M is finite, then σ is said finite-memory, and if M is a singleton, then σ is said memoryless
(each choice only depends on the last vertex of the history).
Realizability and outcomes. For k ∈ N>0, we say a history h = v0 · · · vp is k-realizable
if it corresponds to a history for k agents, i.e., if for all j < p, there exists u ∈ Σk with
u ∈ ∆(vj , vj+1). A history is realizable if it is k-realizable for some k ∈ N>0. Similarly to
histories for finite sequences of consecutive vertices, one can define the notions of (k-)realizable
plays for infinite sequences.
Given a coalition strategy σ, an initial vertex v0 and a number of agents k ∈ N>0, we
define the k-outcome OutkA(v0,σ) as the set of all k-realizable plays induced by σ from v0.
Formally, OutkA(v0,σ) = {v0v1 · · · | ∀j ∈ N>0, [σ(v0 · · · vj)]≤k ∈ ∆(vj , vj+1)}. Note that
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the completeness assumption ensures that the set OutkA(v,σ) is not empty. Then the outcome
of coalition strategy σ is simply OutA(v0,σ) =
⋃
k∈N>0 Out
k
A(v0,σ).
The safety coalition problem. We are now in a position to define our problem of interest.
Given an arena A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉, a set of safe vertices S ⊆ V defines a parameterized safety
game G = (A, S). Without loss of generality we assume from now that V \ S are sinks. A
coalition strategy σ from v0 in the safety game G = (A, S) is said winning if all induced
plays only visit vertices from S: OutA(v,σ) ⊆ Sω. Our goal is to study the decidability and
complexity of the existence of winning coalition strategies, and to synthesize such winning
coalition strategies when they exist. We therefore introduce the following decision problem:
Safety coalition problem
Input: A parameterized safety game G = (A, S) and an initial vertex v0.
Question: Does there exist a coalition strategy σ such that OutA(v0,σ) ⊆ Sω?
The safety coalition problem is a coordination problem: agents should agree on a joint
strategy which, when played in the graph and no matter how many agents are involved, the
resulting play is safe. Note that, due to the link between coalition strategies and tuples of
individual strategies mentioned on page 4, the coalition strategies are distributed: the only
information required for an agent to play her strategy is the history so far, not the number
of agents selected by the environment; however she can infer some information about the
number of agents from the history; this is for instance the case at vertex v3 in the example
of Fig. 2. Note that there is no direct communication between agents.
I Example 3. We have already given in the introduction a winning coalition strategy for
the game in Fig. 1. On the arena in Fig. 2, one can also show that the agents have a
winning coalition strategy σ from v0 to stay within green (i.e. safe) vertices. Consider the
coalition strategy σ such that σ(v0) = abaω, σ(v2) = aω , σ(v0v1) = aω, and σ(v0v2v1) = bω.
Intuitively, on playing abaω from v0, the game either stays in v0 (which is ‘safe’) or moves
to v2 (in case the number of agents k = 1) or to v1 (in case k ≥ 2); from v1, depending
on history, coalition plays either bω (when the history is v0v2v1 and hence k = 1) or aω
(otherwise) which leads the game back to v0 (note that at vertex v2, choice of actions of the
agents is not important, they can collectively play any ω-word). However, one can show that
there is no memoryless coalition winning strategy. Indeed, the coalition strategy aω from v1
is losing for k = 1, similarly bω from v1 is losing for k ≥ 2, and any other strategy is also
losing. For instance, baω from v0 is losing because if the game moves to v1, coalition has no
information on the number of agents and hence any word from v1 will be losing (aω is losing
for k = 1, bω is losing for k ≥ 2, and similarly for other words).
The rest of the paper is devoted to the proof of the following theorem:
I Theorem 4. The safety coalition problem can be solved in exponential space, and is
PSPACE-hard. For positive instances, one can synthesize a winning coalition strategy in
exponential space which uses exponential memory; the exponential blowup in the size of the
memory is tight.
3 Solving the safety coalition problem
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4. To prove the decidability and establish
the complexity upper bound, we construct a tree unfolding of the arena, which is equivalent
for deciding the existence of a winning coalition strategy. The unfolding is finite because,
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v0
v1 v2
v3 v3
v4 v5
v5
v4 v5
v5
(ΣΣ
)+
Σ(ΣΣ) ∗
Σ+ Σ+
(aa) +b(bb) ∗
(aa) +b(bb) ∗
Σ+ Σ+
(a) Tree unfolding of the arena in Fig. 1.
v0 n0
v0 v1 n1 v2 n2 ⊥
v0 ⊥ v1 n′1
v0 ⊥
a
∗ ba
∗ a ∗
b
a
∗
a
Σ
+
b∨a
a
+
b∨a
a
+
(b) Tree unfolding of the arena in Fig. 2.
Figure 3 Tree unfolding examples (green nodes correspond to safe vertices). Notice here that the
unsafe leaves (and the edges leading to them) are presented with dashed rectangles (resp. arrows).
if a vertex is repeated along a play, the coalition can play the same ω-word as in the first
visit, which will be formalized in Section 3.1. We can then show how to solve the safety
coalition problem at the tree level in Section 3.2. Synthesis and memory usage are analyzed
in Section 3.3, and the running example game is discussed in Section 3.4
The hardness result is shown in Section 3.5 by a reduction from the QBF-SAT problem
which is known to be PSPACE-complete [21].
3.1 Finite tree unfolding
From a parameterized safety game G = (A, S), we construct a finite tree as follows: we
unfold the arena A until either some vertex is repeated along a branch or an unsafe vertex is
reached. The edges of the tree are labeled with the same regular languages as in the arena
A. The intuition behind this construction is that if a vertex is repeated in a winning play in
A, the coalition can play the same strategy as it played in the first occurrence of the vertex.
Note however that multiple nodes in the tree may have the same label but different (winning)
strategies depending on the history (recall Example 3). This is the reason why we need to
consider a tree unfolding abstraction and not a DAG abstraction.
We assume the concept of tree is known. Traditionally, we call a node n′ a child of n (and
n the parent of n′) if n′ is an immediate successor of n according to the edge relation; and n
an ancestor of n′ if there exists a path from n to n′ in the tree.
I Definition 5. Let G = (A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉, S) be a parameterized safety game and v0 ∈ V an
initial vertex. The tree unfolding of G is the tree T = 〈N,E, `N , `E〉 rooted at n0 ∈ N , where
N is the set of nodes, E ⊆ N × N is the set of edges, `N : N → V is the node labeling
function, `E : N ×N → 2Σ+ is the edge labeling function, and:
the root n0 satisfies `N (n0) = v0;
∀n ∈ N , if `N (n) ∈ S and for every ancestor n′′ of n, `N (n′′) 6= `N (n), then ∀v′ ∈ V such
that ∆(v, v′) is defined, there is n′ a child of n with `N (n′) = v′ and `E(n, n′) = ∆(v, v′).
Each node in T corresponds to a unique history in G, and the unfolding is stopped when
a vertex repeats or an unsafe vertex is encountered. The set of nodes can be partitioned into
N = Nint unionsqNleaf where Nint is the set of internal nodes and Nleaf are the leaves of T (some
leaves are unsafe, some leaves have an equilabeled ancestor).
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I Example 6. Fig. 3a and 3b represent the tree unfoldings of the parametrized arenas
depicted in Fig. 1 and 2, respectively. On the left picture, the node names are avoided, and
in both the cases their labels are written within the nodes. The leaf nodes that correspond
to unsafe vertices (and the edges leading to them) are presented with dashed rectangles
(respectively, arrows). Notice that any leaf node is either labeled with an unsafe vertex (for
instance, v4 in Fig. 3a) or it has a unique ancestor with the same label. These two criteria
ensure the tree is always finite (along all branches, some vertex has to repeat within |V |
many steps). However, multiple internal nodes in different branches can have same label but,
coalition might have different (winning) strategies depending on their respective histories.
Exponential size tree unfolding. By construction, the height of T is bounded by |V |+ 1
and its branching degree is at most |V |. The tree unfolding of G is hence at most in O(|V ||V |)
and moreover, the exponential blowup is unavoidable in general. The exponential bound
is reached by a family (An)n∈N>0 of deterministic arenas, shown in Figure 4, which is an
extension of the example in Figure 1, with 2n many blocks (and, O(n) many vertices).
Observe that to win the game, coalition needs to keep track of the full histories in the
first n blocks, and there are exponentially many such histories; moreover, each such history
corresponds to a different node in its unfolding tree.
B1
v1
v¯1
B2 ··· Bn
vn
v¯n
C1 C2 ··· Cn >
a
M
1
a +
\a M
1
Σ +
Σ
+
a
M
n
a +
\a M
n
Σ +
Σ
+
aM1
b+\bM1
aMn
b+\bMn
Figure 4 Example arena such that the tree unfolding is exponential. All unspecified transitions
lead to the sink losing vertex ⊥. Set Mi denotes multiples of the i-th prime number. For any play
reaching C1, for every i, the number of agents is in Mi iff the play went through vi.
Let G = (A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉, S) be a parameterized safety game with an initial vertex v0 and
T = 〈N,E, `N , `E〉 be the tree unfolding corresponding to A with root n0. We define the
coalition game on T as follows.
History, play and strategy. Histories in T are defined similarly as in G. A history in T is
a finite sequence of nodes H = n0n1 . . . np ∈ N+ such that for every 0 ≤ j < p, (nj , nj+1) ∈ E.
We denote by HistT the set of all histories in T . A play in T is a maximal history, i.e. a
finite sequence of nodes ending with a leaf, thus in N+int ·Nleaf . Observe that there is a trivial
bijection ι between N and HistT , and we will swap between the two notions using ι when
convenient.
A coalition strategy in the unfolding tree is a mapping λ : Nint → Σω that assigns to every
internal node n ∈ Nint an ω-word λ(n). Notice that a coalition strategy in T is by definition
memoryless (on N) which, as we will see later, is sufficient to capture winning strategies of
the coalition in G. We furthermore extend the definition of node labeling function `N to a
history (resp. play) in the usual way.
Similarly to the parameterized arena setting, for k ∈ N>0, a history H = n0 . . . np is said
k-realizable if for all 0 ≤ j < p, there exists u ∈ Σk with u ∈ `E(nj , nj+1). A history is
realizable if it is k-realizable for some k ∈ N>0. Similar notions of (k-)realizable plays are
defined for infinite sequences.
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For a coalition strategy λ in T (rooted at n0), and a number of agents k ∈ N>0, we
define the k-outcome OutkT (n0,λ) as the set of all k-realizable plays induced by λ from n0:
OutkT (n0,λ) = {n0n1 · · · np ∈ N+int ·Nleaf | ∀1 ≤ j < p, [λ(nj)]≤k ∈ `E(nj , nj+1)}. Moreover,
the outcome of λ from n0 is the set OutT (n0,λ) =
⋃
k∈N>0 Out
k
T (n0,λ).
A coalition strategy λ in T from n0 is winning for the safety condition defined by the
safe set S if every play in OutT (n0,λ) ends in a leaf with label in S, i.e. if for every
R = n0 . . . np ∈ OutT (n0,λ), `N (np) ∈ S, written `N (OutA(n0,λ)) ⊆ S+ for short.
Correctness of the tree unfolding. Next we show the equivalence of the winning strategies
in the safety coalition game, and in the corresponding tree unfolding:
I Lemma 7. Let G = (A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉, S) be a parameterized safety game and v0 ∈ V and
T = 〈N,E, `N , `E〉 be the associated tree unfolding with root n0. There exists a winning
coalition strategy from v0 in G iff there exists a winning coalition strategy from n0 in T .
Proof. Assume first that the coalition of agents has a winning strategy σ in G. Note that
any history H ∈ HistT can be projected to the history `N (H) ∈ HistA. From σ, we define a
strategy λ in T by applying σ to the projected histories. Formally, for every node n ∈ Nint,
we let λ(n) = σ(`N (ι(n))) (recall that ι is the standard bijection between nodes of the tree
and histories in the tree).
To prove that λ is winning in T , consider any play R = n0 · · · np in OutT (n0,λ) and let
ρ = `N (R) = v0 · · · vp be its projection in G. By construction `E(ni, ni+1) = ∆(vi, vi+1) for
each i < p, and hence from the definition of λ, ρ is a history in G induced by σ. Since σ is
winning, ρ only visits safe vertices. In particular, `N (np) ∈ S. Since this is true for every
play induced by λ, strategy λ is winning from n0 in T .
For the other direction, assume now that λ is a winning coalition strategy from n0 in T .
As we will see later, the tree will be the basis of a memory structure sufficient to win the
game (if it is possible), we thus explain how histories in G can be mapped to nodes of T .
We first define a mapping zip : HistA → HistA that summarizes any history in A to its
virtual history where each vertex appears at most once. Intuitively, zip greedily shortens a
history by appropriately removing the loops until an unsafe vertex is encountered (if any).
The mapping zip is defined inductively, starting with zip(v0) = v0, and letting for every
h ∈ HistA and every v′ ∈ V such that h · v′ ∈ HistA,
zip(h · v′) =
{
zip(h) · v′ if v′ does not appear in zip(h)
v0 . . . v
′ v zip(h) otherwise
Note that the mapping zip is well-defined. Indeed, observe that, by construction, for every
history h, any vertex appears at most once in zip(h), so that when v′ appears in zip(h), there
is a unique prefix of zip(h) ending with v′. Note that, since we assumed that unsafe vertices
are sinks, as soon as h reaches an unsafe vertex, the value of zip(h) stays unchanged.
I Lemma 8. The application β : n 7→ `N (ι(n)) defines a bijection between Nint ∪ {n ∈ Nleaf |
`N (n) /∈ S} and the set Z = {zip(h) | h ∈ HistA}.
Proof. It is first obvious that this application is injective, since two nodes of the tree
corresponds to different histories in A which all belong to Z.
This application is surjective: pick h ∈ Z; then, h has no repetition; furthermore it forms
a real history in G, which implies that it can be read as the label of some history in the tree
unfolding. J
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We write α for the inverse mapping from Z (virtual histories) to Nint∪{n ∈ Nleaf | `N (n) /∈
S}. Using the zip function and α, from a coalition strategy λ in T , we define a coalition
strategy σ in G by applying σ to the virtual histories: for every history h = v0 . . . vp in G
we let σ(h) = λ(α(zip(h)) whenever α(zip(h)) ∈ Nint and σ(h) is set arbitrarily otherwise
(recall that if α(zip(h)) is a leaf node, then h is actually already a losing history).
Towards a contradiction, assume that σ is not winning in G. Consider, some number
of agents k ∈ N>0, and a losing play with k agents: ρ = v0v1 . . . ∈ OutkA(v0,σ). Let
h′ = v0v1 . . . vq v ρ be the shortest prefix of ρ ending in an unsafe vertex vq /∈ S, and write
zip(h′) = v0vi1 . . . vq for the corresponding virtual history. By definition of σ, zip(h′) is a
k-outcome of σ from v0. Moreover, the corresponding play R = ι(α(zip(h′))) = n0ni1 . . . nq
in T , belongs to the k-outcome of λ from n0. Since vq /∈ S, λ is not winning in T ; which is
a contradiction. We conclude that σ is a winning coalition strategy in G. J
I Example 9. We illustrate the zip function on the arena in Fig. 2. Take h = v0v1v0v1.
First, zip(v0) = v0; then zip(v0v1) = zip(v0) · v1 = v0v1; zip(v0v1v0) = v0 (which is the unique
prefix of zip(v0v1) = v0v1, ending at v0); finally zip(v0v1v0v1) = zip(v0v1v0) ·v1 = v0v1. Then
the function α uniquely maps each virtual history (i.e. zip(h)) ending at a safe vertex to an
internal node in the tree, which is the heart of the proof of Lemma 7.
3.2 Existence of winning coalition strategy on the tree unfolding
In the previous subsection, we showed that the safety coalition problem reduces to solving
the existence of a winning coalition strategy in the associated finite tree unfolding.
To solve the latter, from the tree unfolding T , we construct a deterministic (safety)
automaton over the alphabet Σm, where m = |Nint|, which accepts the ω-words corresponding
to winning coalition strategies in T . More precisely, since (Σm)ω and (Σω)m are in a one-to-
one correspondence, an infinite word w ∈ (Σm)ω corresponds to infinite words wn, one for
each internal node n ∈ Nint, thus representing a coalition strategy in T .
Fix G = (A, S) a parameterized safety game with A = 〈V,Σ,∆〉 and v0 ∈ V an initial
vertex. We assume for every (v, v′) ∈ V × V such that ∆(v, v′) 6= ∅, ∆(v, v′) is given as a
complete DFA over Σ. Those will be given as inputs to the algorithm.
Let T = 〈N,E, `N , `E〉 be the associated unfolding tree with root n0. For the rest of
this section, we fix an arbitrary ordering on the internal nodes of T and on the edges:
Nint = {n1, . . . , nm} and E = {e1, . . . , er}, with |Nint| = m and |E| = r.
Assuming there are t leaves –thus t plays– in T , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ t, the i-th play is
denoted ni0 . . . nizi with ni0 = n0, ∀j < zi, nij ∈ Nint and nizi ∈ Nleaf . Also, for 0 ≤ j < zi, we
note eij = (nij , nij+1).
The automaton for the winning coalition strategies in T builds on the finite automata
that recognize the regular languages that label edges of T . For each edge e ∈ E, let us write
Be = (Qe,Σ, δe, q0e , Fe) for the complete DFA over Σ such that L(Be) = `E(e). (Here Qe
is the set of states, δe the transition function, q0e ∈ Qe the initial state and Fe the set of
accepting states.) Note that some of the Be’s are identical since they correspond to the same
original edge of G.
We then define a deterministic safety automaton B = (Q,Σm, δ, q0, F ) that accepts
ω-words over alphabet Σm as follows: Q ⊆ Q1× . . .×Qr is the set of states; q0 = (q01 , . . . , q0r)
is the initial state; the transition relation δ executes the r automata Be’s componentwise: if
letter u ∈ Σm is read, then make the s-th component mimick Bes by reading the l-th letter
of u, where l is the index of the source node of es; and the accepting set F is composed of all
10 Synthesizing safe coalition strategies
states q = (q1, . . . , qr) that satisfy the following Boolean formula:
ϕ =
∧
1≤i≤t
ϕi where ϕi =
[ ∧
0≤j<zi
qei
j
∈ Fei
j
]
⇒ `N (nizi) ∈ S
 .
Note that B is equipped with a safety acceptance condition:2 an infinite run ζ = q0q1q2 . . .
of B is accepting if for every k ≥ 1, qk ∈ F , and L(B) consists of all words w whose unique
corresponding run is accepting.
Intuitively, ϕi expresses that if for some number of agents k, the languages along the
i-th maximal path contain the k-length prefixes of corresponding ω-words (which means the
induced play is k-realizable), then it should lead to a safe leaf; and then ϕ ensures that this
should be true for all plays. This is formalized in the next lemma.
I Lemma 10. Let λ : Nint → Σω be a coalition strategy in T . Then, λ is winning if and
only if (λ(n1),λ(n2), . . . ,λ(nm)) ∈ L(B).
Notice that in the latter statement, we slightly abuse notation: (λ(n1),λ(n2), . . . ,λ(nm))
belongs to (Σω)m, however it uniquely maps to a word in (Σm)ω, that can thus be read in B.
Proof. Assume λ : Nint → Σω is a winning coalition strategy in T , and consider the
corresponding word w = (λ(n1),λ(n2), . . . ,λ(nm)). Let us show that w ∈ L(B). Consider
the infinite run ζ = q0q1 . . . of B on w. Fix a number of agents k ∈ N>0. Since λ is winning,
any k-length prefix of λ-induced play in OutkT (n0,λ) is winning. Therefore for any 1 ≤ i ≤ t
such that ni0 . . . nizi is in Out
k
T (n0,λ), the play satisfies for all 0 ≤ j < zi, [λ(nij)]≤k ∈ `E(eij)
and furthermore, `N (nizi) ∈ S; and hence qk |= ϕi. Otherwise, if a length k-play is not
induced by λ, then ϕi is vacuously true for that i ≤ t. We conclude qk |= ϕ. Since this is
true for every k ∈ N>0, w ∈ L(B).
Let now λ be an arbitrary coalition strategy, and assume w = (λ(n1),λ(n2), . . . ,λ(nm)) ∈
L(B) with ζ = q0q1 . . . the accepting run on w. Then for any number of agents k ∈ N>0,
qk ∈ F , and hence qk |= ϕ. Therefore for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, qk |= ϕi. Fix any such i; let ni0 . . . nizi be
the i-th maximal path, and write qk = (qk1 , . . . , qkr ). Then for some 0 ≤ j < zi, the condition
qk
ej
i
∈ Fej
i
implies [λ(nij)]≤k ∈ `E(eij). In case the above is true for all 0 ≤ j < zi, we conclude
ni0 . . . nizi ∈ OutkT (n0,λ) and ϕi ensures that `N (nizi) ∈ S. Otherwise, ni0 . . . nizi /∈ OutkT (n0,λ).
Finally ϕ ensures all k-length prefixes of λ-induced plays in T are winning. Since this is true
for any number of agents k, λ is a winning coalition strategy in T . J
We now have all ingredients to solve the safety coalition problem, and to state a complexity
upper-bound. As mentioned earlier, we assume that the arena is initially given with all
associated complete DFAs (used by all Be) in the input.
I Theorem 11. The safety coalition problem is in EXPSPACE.
Proof. Solving the safety coalition problem reduces to checking non-emptiness of the language
recognized by the deterministic safety automaton B. We adapt to our setting the standard
algorithm which runs in non-deterministic logarithmic space, when B is given as an input.
We write N for the number of states of B and notice that N is doubly exponential in
|V |, the number of vertices of the initial arena A (each state of B is an exponential-size
vector of states of automata given in the input). We do not build B a priori. Instead, we
2 This is a slight abuse of language since q0 need not be in the safe set F .
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non-deterministically guess a safe prefix of length at most N (we only keep written two
consecutive configurations and keep a counter to count up to N), and then a safe lasso on
the last state of length at most N .
Provided one can check ‘easily’ whether a state of B is safe, q the described procedure runs
in non-deterministic exponential space, hence can be turned into a deterministic exponential
space algorithm, by Savitch’s theorem.
It remains to explain how one checks that a given state in B is safe. Formula ϕ is an
exponential-size SAT formula (in the size of A), which can therefore be solved in exponential
space as well.
Overall, we conclude that the safety coalition problem is in EXPSPACE. J
3.3 Synthesizing a winning coalition strategy
We assume all the notations of the two previous subsections, and we explain how we build a
winning coalition strategy. From an accepting word of the form u ·vω in B (where u ∈ (Σm)∗
and v ∈ (Σm)+), one can synthesize a winning strategy λ in T by:
λ(ni) = ui · vωi for every ni ∈ Nint.
Then it is easy to transfer to a winning coalition strategy σ in G by defining
σ(h) = λ(α(zip(h))) for every history h ∈ HistA,
that is, the ω-word corresponding to the internal node representing its virtual history. Recall
that, following the proof of Lemma 7, zip assigns to every history its virtual history (by
greedily removing all the loops) and α associates to a virtual history its corresponding node
in the tree T .
It is not difficult to see that the tree unfolding can be used as a memory structure of a
winning coalition strategy, yielding the following result.
I Proposition 12. If there is a winning coalition strategy for a game G = (A, S), then
there is one which uses exponential memory, which can be computed in exponential space.
Furthermore, winning might indeed require exponential memory.
Proof. The tree unfolding can be seen as a memory structure for a winning strategy. Indeed,
consider the memory set defined byNint, starting from memory state n0. Define the application
upd : Nint × V → Nint by upd(n, v′) = n′ such that v′ ∈ S whenever
either n′ ∈ Nint is a child of n such that `N (n′) = v′
or n′ ∈ Nint is an ancestor of n′′ ∈ Nleaf such that `N (n′′) = `N (n′) = v′, and n′′ is a child
of n.
We also define the application act : Nint × V → Σω by act(n, v) = λ(n).
Then, it is easy to see that winning strategy σ can be defined using memory Nint and
applications upd and act.
Furthermore, though the ω-words extracted fom B can be of doubly-exponential size,
their computation and the overall procedure only requires exponential space.
For the lower bound, we show the following lemma.
I Lemma 13. There is a family of games (Gn)n such that the size of Gn is polynomial in n
but winning coalition strategies require exponential memory.
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p0 p1
b
aa
(a) Automaton for a∗ba∗.
q0 q1
a
(b) Automaton for a.
r0 r1
Σ
Σ
(c) Automaton for Σ+.
s0
s1
s2
s3
a
b
a
a
(d) Automaton for b ∨ aa+.
Figure 5 Automata correspond-
ing to the input languages of Fig. 2.
The automata are not complete
for sake of readability; all unspe-
cified letters lead to a (sink) non-
accepting state ‘×’.
p0
p0
q0
s0
r0
s0
p0
p0
q1
s1
r1
s3
p1
p1
×
s2
r1
×
p1
p1
×
s1
r1
s3
p1
p1
×
s3
r1
s3
p1
p1
×
×
r1
×
· · ·
· · ·

a
a
Σ
Σ


a
a
Σ
b
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
b
a
Σ
Σ
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
b
a
Σ
b
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
b
b
Σ
b
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
a
Σ
Σ
Σ

Figure 6 Automaton B corresponding to the tree given
in Fig. 3b. Here we have only shown the accepting states
(marked in blue) and some of the non-accepting states. Fur-
ther explanations are given in Example 14.
Proof. Again we consider the game of Fig 4, whose description can be made in polynomial
time (since the i-th prime number uses only log(i) bits in its binary representation). We
have already seen that its tree unfolding has exponential size. We will argue why exponential
memory is required, that is, one cannot do better than the tree memory structure.
First notice that there is a winning coalition strategy: play aω at every vertex Bi, and
aω (resp. bω) at vertex Ci if the history went through vi (resp. v¯i). This strategy can be
implemented using the memory given by the tree unfolding.
Assume one can do better and have a memory structure of size strictly smaller than 2n.
Then, arriving in vertex C1, there are at least two different histories leading to the same
memory state, hence the coalition strategy will select exactly the same ω-words in all vertices
C1, C2, ..., Cn. We realize that it cannot be winning since the two histories disagree at least
on a predicate “be a multiple of the i-th prime number”. Contradiction. J
J
3.4 Illustration of the construction
We illustrate the construction on one example.
I Example 14. Fig. 6 represents part of the automaton B corresponding to the tree T in
Fig. 3b (that is, the tree unfolding of the arena in Fig. 2). The automata Be for the languages
labeling the edges of T are depicted in Fig. 5. Here notice that each state of B has as many
components as the number of edges leading to a safe node in T , we did not consider the
edges leading to ⊥. This is without loss of any generality: the language on any ‘unsafe’ edge
leading to ⊥, in this example, are disjoint from the languages on the edges leading to its
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siblings (other children of its parent node). The first three positions in a state of B, presented
as a single cell in the picture, correspond to the outgoing edges of the root n0 of T (hence
they follow the same component in Σm), and the other positions correspond to the other
edges (in some chosen order). ‘×’ in a component of a state denotes the non-accepting sink
state of the corresponding automaton (as mentioned in Fig. 5). Finally, here we have only
shown the accepting states (marked in blue) and some of the non-accepting states. Indeed
one can verify that the states which are colored in blue satisfy the formula ϕ; for instance, the
state (p1, p1,×, s2, r1,×) on the right corresponds to the two maximal paths v0v0 and v0v1v0
in T (notice we used the node labels here), and all of them lead to safe nodes. The infinite
execution in blue (i.e. all the words in (a, a,Σ, b) · (b, a,Σ,Σ) · (a, a,Σ,Σ)ω) corresponds to
the winning coalition strategies in the tree: for instance, λ(n0) = abaω; λ(n1) = aω; for any
a ∈ Σ, λ(n2) = aω; and λ(n′1) = bω is a winning coalition strategy (note here, for instance,
that at node n2, any word from Σω could be played).
3.5 PSPACE lower bound
We show the safety coalition problem is PSPACE-hard by reduction from QBF-SAT, which is
known to be PSPACE-complete [21]. The construction is inspired by the one in [4], where the
first agent was playing against the coalition of all other agents, with a reachability objective.
I Proposition 15. The safety coalition problem is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Let ϕ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3 . . . ∀x2r ·
(
C1 ∧ C2 ∧ . . . ∧ Cm
)
be a quantified Boolean formula
in prenex normal form, where for every 1 ≤ h ≤ m, Ch = `h,1 ∨ `h,2 ∨ `h,3, and for every
1 ≤ j ≤ 3, `h,j ∈ {xi,¬xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r} are the literals.
In the reduction, we use sets of natural numbers (that represent the number of agents)
corresponding to multiples of primes. Let thus pi be the i-th prime number and Mi the set
of all non-zero natural numbers that are multiples of pi. For simplicity, we write aMi to
denote the set of words in (api)+, that is words from a+ whose length is a multiple of pi. It
is well-known that the i-th prime number requires O(log(i)) bits in its binary representation,
hence the description of each of the above languages is polynomial in the size of ϕ.
From ϕ, we construct an arena Aϕ = 〈V,Σ,∆〉 as follows:
V = {v0, v1, . . . , v2r−1, v2r} ∪ {x1, x¯1, . . . , x2r, x¯2r} ∪ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cm,Cm+1} ∪ {⊥,>},
where we identify some vertices: v2r = C1, and Cm+1 = >.
Σ = {a, b, c} ∪⋃1≤i≤2r{ai}.
For every 0 ≤ s ≤ r−1, every 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r and every 1 ≤ h ≤ m:
1. ∆(v2s, x2s+1) = aM2s+1 and ∆(v2s, x¯2s+1) = b+ \ bM2s+1
2. ∆(v2s,>) = (a+ \ aM2s+1) ∪ bM2s+1
3. ∆(v2s+1, x2s+2) = cM2s+2 and ∆(v2s+1, x¯2s+2) = c+ \ cM2s+2
4. ∆(xi, vi) = Σ+ and ∆(x¯i, vi) = Σ+
5. ∆(Ch,Ch+1) =
⋃
1≤j≤3 Lh,j where Lh,j = a
Mi
i if `h,j = xi; Lh,j = a+i \ aMii if
`h,j = ¬xi.
To obtain a complete arena, all unspecified transitions lead to vertex ⊥.
On the arena Aϕ, we consider the safety coalition game Gϕ = (Aϕ, S) with S = V \ {⊥}.
The construction is illustrated on a simple example with 3 variables and 2 clauses in Fig. 7.
From v0, a first phase up to v2r = C1 consists in choosing a valuation for the variables.
The coalition chooses the truth values of existentially quantified variables x2s+1 in vertices
v2s: it plays aω for true, and bω for false. In the first (resp. second) case, if the number of
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bM3
a
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1
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2
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3
a
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1
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2
a
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3
Figure 7 Parameterized arena for the formula ϕ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3 · (x1∨¬x2∨¬x3)∧ (x1∨¬x2∨x3).
All unspecified transitions lead to the sink losing vertex ⊥. Set Mi denotes multiples of the i-th
prime number. Vertex xi (resp. x¯i) represents setting variable xi to true (resp. false). For any
play reaching C1, for every i, the number of agents is in Mi iff the play went through xi.
agents involved in the coalition is (resp. is not) a multiple of p2s+1, then the game proceeds
to the next variable choice, otherwise the safe > state is reached (forever).
For universally quantified variables the coalition must play cω in vertices v2s+1, as any
other choice would immediately lead to the sink losing vertex ⊥; the choice of the assignment
then only depends on whether the number of agents involved in the coalition is a multiple of
p2s+2 (in which case variable x2s+2 is assigned true) or not (in which case variable x2s+2 is
assigned false).
Hence, depending on the number of agents involved in the coalition, either the play will
proceed to state v2r = C1, in which case the number of agents characterizes the valuation of
the variables (it is a multiple of pi if and only if variable xi is set to true); or it will have
escaped to the safe state >.
Note that in terms of information, the coalition learns progressively assignments (thanks
to the visit to either vertex xi or vertex x¯i). Note also that the coalition can never learn
assignments of next variables in advance (it can only know whether it is a multiple of
previously seen prime numbers, hence of previously quantified variables, not of variables
quantified afterwards).
From C1, a second phase starts where one checks whether the generated valuation makes
all clauses in ϕ true. If it is the case, sequentially, the coalition chooses for every clause
a literal that makes the clause true. The arena forces these choices to be consistent with
the valuation generated in the first phase. For instance, on the example of Fig. 7, to set x1
to true in the first phase, coalition must play aω, and only plays with a number of agents
in M1 do not move to > and continue the first phase from x1. Then, in the second phase,
for instance for the first clause, one can choose literal `1,1 = x1 by playing aω1 . The same
language –a1M1– labels the edge from C1 to C2, so that the play proceeds to C2. More
generally, if aωi leads from Ch to Ch+1 with number of agents in Mi, this means that xi was
visited, hence indeed xi was set to true. On the contrary, if aωi leads from Ch to Ch+1 with
number of agents not in Mi, this means that x¯i was visited, hence indeed xi was set to false.
To complete the proof sketch given above, we now formally prove that the reduction indeed
ensures the following equivalence: coalition has a winning strategy in the parameterized
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safety game Gϕ = (Aϕ, S) if and only if ϕ is true.
For `h,j a literal of ϕ, we write γ(`h,j) for the constraint associated with `h,j in the second
phase of the reduction. More precisely,
γ(`h,j) =
{
Mi if `h,j = xi
¬Mi if `h,j = ¬xi
We rely on the following correspondence between histories from v0 to C1 and valuations
over {x1, · · · , x2r}: the valuation ιpi associated with a history pi = v0v′1v1v′2v2 · · ·C1 is such
that ιpi(xi) = 1 if v′i = xi and ιpi(xi) = 0 if v′i = x¯i. This correspondence defines a bijection, so
that, given a valuation ι over {x1, · · · , x2r}, there is a unique history piι = v0v′1v1v′2v2 · · ·C1
with v′i = xi if ι(xi) = 1, and v′i = x¯i
Moreover, after a finite history pi = v0v′1v1v′2v2 · · ·C1, the coalition can deduce the number
of agents is in the set Kpi =
⋂
i≤2r Pi where for each i, Pi = Mi if v′i = xi and Pi = ¬Mi if
v′i = x¯i.
There is thus also a bijection between valuations and possible knowledge about the number
of agents at C1, so that we abusively write Kι when ι is a fixed valuation over {x1, · · · , x2r}.
Note that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r, Kι ∩ {Mi,¬Mi} is either a subset of Mi (when ι(xi) = 1)
or a subset of ¬Mi (when ι(xi) = 0). Also an extension of a history pi = v0v′1v1v′2v2 · · ·C1
either leads to ⊥, or continues in the main part of the game, in which case it does not refine
the knowledge set Kι further.
I Lemma 16. Let ι be a valuation of {x1, · · · , x2r}. Then ι |= C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm if and only if
coaltion has a winning strategy in Gϕ starting from C1, if the number of agents k is in Kι .
Proof. Assume ι |= C1∧· · ·∧Cm. For every 1 ≤ h ≤ m, there is `h,j (literal of Ch) such that
ι(`h,j) = 1. We define the following strategy σ for coalition: from vertex Ch, the strategy
plays the word αωh defined by αh = ai if `h,j = xi or ¬xi. By property on Kι, Kι ⊆ γ(`h,j).
Thus, σ avoids ⊥, and is therefore winning for every k ∈ Kι.
Conversely, pick a winning strategy σ for coalition from C1 against Kι. This strategy
plays uniformly for all k ∈ Kι, say coalition chooses αhω from Ch. If for some 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r,
αh = ai, then either xi or ¬xi is a literal of Ch. If ∆(Ch,Ch+1) contains aiMi , then xi is the
literal in Ch and Kι ⊆ γ(xi); the construction guarantees that ι(xi) = 1. A similar reasoning
applies to the case where ∆(Ch,Ch+1) contains a+i \ aiMi to show ι(xi) = 0. In all cases, Ch
is satisfied by ι. J
Lemma 16 formalizes the link between winning strategies for coalition in the second phase
(that is, from C1) and satisfying valuations. It remains to relate strategies for coaltion in the
first phase and decision functions for the variable quantifications in ϕ.
The two-player game underlying the quantifications of ϕ coincides with the coalition
game played in the first phase. In particular, strategies coincide in the two games. Fix a
coalition strategy σ in the quantification game or equivalently in the first phase. For every
valuation ι which is generated by σ in the quantification game, there is an outcome pi ending
in C1 such that ι = ιpi. Conversely, for every outcome pi ending in C1, ιpi is generated by σ
in the quantification game.
J
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4 Future work
v0 v1v2
a∗bΣ+\(a∗b+a∗ba+)
a∗ba+ Σ+Σ+
Figure 8 Example of a reachability coalition
game: a winning coalition strategy is that Agent n
plays a for the first n−1 rounds, then b for one
round, and finally a forever.
In this paper, we focused on and obtained
results for the coalition problem for safety
objectives. The problem can obviously be
defined for other objectives. The finite tree
unfolding technique will not be correct in
a general setting. We illustrate this on the
game arena in Fig. 8. In this example, the
goal is to collectively reach the target v1.
One can do so if, at v0, the last agent in-
volved plays a b whereas all the others play a. On the other hand, at v0, it is safe if exactly
one agent plays a b and the other plays an a. Coalition has a winning strategy: Agent n
plays action a for the first n−1 rounds, then plays b, and finally plays a for the remaining
steps. Doing so, each agent will in turn play action b, and when the last agent does so, the
play will reach v1. Notice that, for each agent (and hence for the coalition), the strategy
when going through v0 differs at some step (at every step from the coalition point-of-view),
so no finite tree unfolding will be correct.
As future work, we obviously would like to match lower and upper bounds for the safety
coalition problem, but more importantly we would like to investigate more general objectives.
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